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Abstract
The literature on nominal interest rates rigidity does not fully ad-
dress its macroeconomic implications. How nominal interest rates
rigidity would interact with the Fisher equation is simple, yet the
implications are surprising. If nominal rates cannot catch up to real
rates, the Fisher effect becomes inverted in the short term: big enough
credit crunches bring deflation and central banks must lower interest
rates to stimulate inflation. The paper shows that nominal interest
rates rigidity is sufficient to characterize the little we know about in-
flation. It also shows that, unlike for other products, the pricing of
loans is influenced by past negotiated loans, generating rigidity.
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1 Introduction
Posing nominal rigidities explains stylized facts about inflation more easily
when applied to nominal interest rates than to prices. The inverse relation
between interest rates and inflation in the conduct of monetary policy and
the procyclical nature of inflation are the two main stylized facts of interest
about inflation. Central banks do raise interest rates to lower inflation and
lower them to raise inflation. This was recognized well before Taylor (1993);
in fact, the Federal Reserve under Volker made the point quite forcefully. As
for the procyclical nature of inflation, the data has established it thoroughly.
Furthermore, the current popular model, the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(NKPC), lacks parsimony both in its derivation and in the way it would
explain those two main stylized facts.1 To visualize nominal interest rates
rigidities, imagine if nominal interest rates were perfectly constant for some
reason: when the real interest rate goes up, inflation goes down if the nominal
interest rate can’t move.
Research about interest rate setting points to a resistance in nominal
interest rates both in the pass-through from central banks target rate to
market rates (interest rate pass-through) and from market rates to lend-
ing rates. Kobayashi (2008, Section 2) surveys literature on interest rate
pass-through and Dinger (forthcomming) and de Bondt, Mojon and Valla
(2005), on bank rate rigidities; see also Illes and Lombardi (2013) for recent
issues related to the financial crisis. This literature indicates that imperfect
pass-through correlates with the financial soundness of individual banks, the
predictability of monetary policy, a level of income smoothing from banks
and, as de Bondt (2005) found, the long term interest rate is the key vari-
able explaining the imperfect pass-through of monetary policy. Still, most of
this research focuses on empirical aspects of nominal interest rate rigidities
or theoretical justifications for them, little research, however, has been con-
ducted on the macroeconomic effects of those rigidities. Macroeconomists
may have ignored interest rate rigidities because the control of nominal rates
by monetary authorities seems perfect as indicated by Figure 1.1 and 1.2 of
Woodford (2003). Now, perfect control does not mean direct control, and
nominal rigidities may imply that market operations need to disproportion-
ately affect real rates.
1See Woodford (2003) for a discussion and derivation of the the NKPC.
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Relationship banking can explain interest rate smoothing by banks.2 The
relationship between banks and their clients enable a form of intertemporal
smoothing of interest rate shocks as proposed by Berger and Udell (1992)
after they found that bank rate rigidities may not come, as previously though,
from rationing. I will take a parallel road and not implicitly model a bank,
though the notion of risk sharing is implicit in the model presented in Section
2.
Carmichael and Stebbing (1983) also tackled nominal interest rate rigidi-
ties. They argue that the source of rigidities was competition from money
which has a constant (zero) nominal yield. In their view, the actual after-tax
nominal interest rates represents only “a real risk premium on financial as-
sets” and inflation seems to be an exogenous variable to interest rate setting.
Their approach leads to what they call the Inverted Fisher effect. This paper
also has an inverted Fisher effect, but the channels go from real interest rates
and monetary policy to inflation instead of inflation to real interest rates.
Other authors like Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Kobayashi (2008) in-
vestigates the implications of rate rigidities by incorporating them to stan-
dard models with price rigidities (DSGE’s). It results in a modified NKPC
with interest rates added to real marginal cost, or to the output gap, as
drivers for inflation. Using interest rate rigidities inside a price-rigidity frame-
work avoids coherence problems due to the incompatibility between interest
rates and price rigidities. But the central bank still has to raise interest rates
to create inflation. Because of this, their framework is not a halfway solution
to the one proposed here.
I take the view that we should ignore price rigidities, at least for now.
First, modeling both price and nominal interest rate rigidities makes it hard
to discern which has what effect. Second, and most important for the sake
of parsimony, the model presented here does not need to be built on top of
both the NKPC postulates and the ones presented in Section 2.
Section 2 presents a model that yields rigidities through negotiations of
nominal interest rates, once the real ones are chosen or imposed, between
lenders and borrowers. Marginal behavior and perfect competition result in
the minimization of average wealth transfers because of the influence nominal
interest rates has on already-issued debts when real interest rates are not at
play. The model performs this minimization while accounting for monetary
authorities interventions.
2See Berlin and Mester (1999), Boot (2000), Freixas (2005) on relationship banking.
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Section 3 presents a numerical illustration in the form of impulse respond
functions and simulations. The impulse respond functions show how inflation
targeting reduces real interest rates volatility. They also uncovers a price
puzzle a` la Sims in inflation dynamics from the preemptive nature of nominal
adjustments. For their part, the simulations show how different episode
of inflation and interest rate movements in the last hundred years can be
modeled simply through monetary policy shocks while keeping other shocks
the same. Simulations suggest inflation targeting reduces real interest rates
variability, while a gold standard increases real interest rates volatility, giving
some sense for the causes of the Great Moderation.
2 Model
Subsection 2.1 of this section contains a general discussion on rigidities and
inflation. The goal is to motivate the model built in Subsection 2.2.
2.1 General discussion
A reading of the history of macroeconomic theories (Blanchard (2000) or
textbook) leads one to conclude that an understanding of inflation has to
come from some sort of rigidity and that choice must be made on which
rigidity, prices, interest rates or velocity of money, is best. The quantity
theory and monetarist tradition relied on the rigidity of velocity, but when it
comes to velocity, this paper takes the view that finding a credible theory of
velocity is a dead end, because the velocity term in the equation of exchange
is endogenous to the other terms and because the very definition of money
makes it hard to model (Sims (2013)). New Keynesians rely on the rigidity of
prices themselves. In both the Fisher equation (i ' r + pi) and the equation
of exchange (MV = PY ), there are two free variables. A use of the Fisher
equation forces one to posit either price or nominal interest rate rigidities for
identification purposes.
Then whether stickiness is a solution at all is problematic not only because
we have to postulate a possibly unattractive form for it, but also because we
have to choose which variable is sticky or stickier. This paper examines
rigidities in nominal interest rates to determine whether they create a simple
and credible narrative for the behavior of inflation. The choice comes first
from the argument that even if price rigidities were more probable, there
4
would still be a need to investigate other possibilities. Second, the narrative
for price rigidities is more complex than that for interest rates. Third, if
both prices and nominal interest rates were rigid, interest rates rigidities
may dominate as interest rates affect profits more than do prices.
The narrative for price rigidities is more complex than that for nominal
interest rate rigidities. Though the approach has an intuitive explanation of
procyclical inflation (Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)), it is less fluid for the
conduct of monetary policy. If the nominal interest rate goes up, inflation
can’t follow when prices are sticky and so real interest rate goes up. That
would result in inflationary pressures unless the side effects of the rise in
real interest rate is to lower marginal costs. In other words, the narrative
goes against experience unless we tweak the model so higher real rates lower
marginal costs. In terms of derivation, the NKPC poses monopolistic compe-
tition between symmetric firms and Calvo contracts, making the model less
parsimonious than the one I propose.
Using nominal interest rates also has the advantage over prices that their
volatility in micro data is much lower, as shown by Craig and Dinger (forth-
comming). Furthermore, if we take the view that both prices and interest
rates are sticky, interest rates rigidities may dominate. Interest rates have
a disproportionate effect on profits compared to prices or even wages since
future profits are discounted using interest rates while only relative prices
and real wages affect profits. Then, if interest rates rigidities dominate, the
mechanics still pushes the firms able to update their prices in a way that
compensates for the firms that cannot.
From a new classical point of view (of money neutrality), only interest
rates determine inflation. Interest rates bind statics and dynamics to a model,
and if the Quantity Theory does not mean much, then the Fisher equation
has to be the only determinant of inflation. For example, an RBC model
would put everything in real terms letting inflation and nominal interest
rates be thrown outside the model, making nominal interest rates undefined.
If we define interest rate rigidities within an otherwise new classical context,
inflation would still be procyclical, but central banks would have to be pos-
tulated to have a roˆle. As is shown in the discussion for equation (5), the
existence of a Taylor rule, or the possibility that a central bank raises interest
rates when it thinks inflation is too high, supposes that it is not a neutral
institution.
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2.2 Implementation
Three equations determine inflation, real and nominal interest rates. The
Fisher equation translates real and nominal interest rates into inflation, the
rigidity equation translates real interest rates into nominal interest rates
and the real interest rates equation comes from the real economy, but with
feedback from monetary policy. A larger, more complete, model would be
superfluous; there is no point in defending the postulates necessary to build
it and make this paper overly long.
The first equation,
1 + it = Et [(1 + rt+1)(1 + pit+1)] , (1)
yields the ex-ante definition of real interest rates, or Fisher’s equation. The
notation is standard, i is nominal interest rates, r is real interest rates and
pi is inflation.
At question here is whether the equation’s interest rates represent the in-
terest a government or a strong-credit entity pays or a representative agent’s
interest rate, since headline inflation does not represent what governments or
strong-credit entities buy, but what everyone buys. I ignore this issue as this
is not an empirical paper. Subsection 3.3 discusses this and other empirical
issues.
The second equation of the model implements the rigidity in nominal
interest rates. The form it should take is not obvious.
The rigidity equation is the one that defines the model. It comes from ne-
gotiations between lenders and borrowers. Negotiations mean nominal rates
are set by minimizing average wealth transfers unlike real rates that have to
contend with the real economy. This minimization leads to a “Compensation
Mechanism” that translates changes in real interest rates in part to changes
in nominal interest rates and in part to changes in inflation. Monetary policy
keeps agents from deferring the adjustment and leads to the “Relent Mech-
anism” that forces agents to relent to the central bank’s inflation target in
order for future real interest rates forecast not to be biased. The rigidity
equation becomes a weighted average of both mechanisms.
The minimizing average of wealth transfers determine nominal interest
rates in the model as both lenders and borrowers act in perfect competition,
setting rates to yield zero expected profits. Loans are different from other
products in that the past affects present pricing because nominal interest
rates affect the wealth of agents to a larger extent than does the loans being
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negotiated at any point in time. Therefore, price setting in a competitive
environment means the best nominal rates each side can offer is the one that
minimizes average wealth transfers.
The real rates will not be set in this way because borrowers and lenders
have to contend with competition from the real economy. Borrowers and
lenders turn into price takers when confronted by intertemporal preferences
and the marginal productivity of capital.
Since exogenous changes in real interest rates can either be achieved
through nominal interest rates or inflation, what these two options means
to lenders and borrowers will determine the amount of pass-through from
real to nominal rates. Changes in nominal interest rates affect only the
wealth of people who don’t fully expect to keep to the maturity date, while
people who will not hold are equally affected by unexpected changes in both
inflation and nominal interest rates. Because reinvestment neutralizes the
effects of changes in nominal interest rates, people who intend to hold a debt
or bond until maturity are only affected by unexpected inflation. Therefore,
in the short term, a “Compensation Mechanism” can be constructed. If this
mechanism was the only one in play, the equation would take the form of
it − Et−1 [it] =
∞∑
s=0
βsλt,t+s
(
1− ηt,t+s
2
)
(Et [rt+1+s]− Et−1 [rt+1+s]) , (2)
where β is the discount factor, λt,t+s is the fraction of debts at time t that
have maturities at or beyond t+ s and ηt,t+s is the expected fraction of debts
in λt,t+s that are expected to be sold or reimbursed at time t+ s.
Since the model will get a little more complicated, lets define x, for read-
ability, as
xt ≡
∞∑
s=0
βsλt,t+s
(
1− ηt,t+s
2
)
(Et [rt+1+s]− Et−1 [rt+1+s]) .
Note that agents immediately have to account for future expected changes
in real interest rates. As such, this leads to the preempted aspect of interest
changes and generates the price puzzle described by Sims (1992). Agents can-
not defer the adjustment because the inflation targets of monetary authorities
will not permit trade-offs between nominal interest rates and inflation when
they are known early in advance. This leads to the “Relent Mechanism”.
The Relent Mechanism determines nominal interest rates in the long term.
Agents have to relent to monetary authorities in order for expected real
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interest rates to equal the ones they are negotiating. Monetary authorities’
actions to achieve their target inflation rate has a predictable effect on real
interest rates if the nominal interest rate is different from the sum of the
expected real interest rate and the target inflation rate. Because agents need
their expected real rate to be unbiased, for the longer term, we have the
Relent Mechanism. For a large enough v, the equation,
Et [it+v] = Et
[
pi∗t+1+v + rt+1+v
]
, (3)
simply states that agents negotiate nominal and real interest rates at longer
maturity by giving in to monetary authorities. This is done to keep the
central bank from messing up their negotiated prices. pi∗t+1+v is the central
bank inflation target for time t+ 1 + v.
The rigidity equation will come from a weighted average of both equation
(2) and equation (3) using a parameter ωs. It should be noted that the
Relent Mechanism still uses expected real rates, not the rates that would be
in use without monetary authority intervention. This way, agents weigh in
interventions they already know will happen.
At time t + s, with s < v, we have a mix of both mechanism that takes
the form
Et [it+s] = (1− ωs+1) Et
[
pi∗t+1+s + rt+1+s
]
+ ωs+1 (xt + Et−1 [it+s]) .
When taken back in time, the equation can be written as
Et−s [it] = (1− ωs+1) Et−s
[
pi∗t+1 + rt+1
]
+ ωs+1 (xt−s + Et−1−s [it]) ,
which solves recursively to yield
it =
∞∑
s=0
(
(1− ωs+1) Et−s
[
pi∗t+1 + rt+1
]
+ ωs+1xt−s
) s∏
z=0
ωz (4)
by posing ωs = 0 for a large s and ω0 = 1 to shorten the equation.
While equation (1) and the latter equation (5) are conventional, this
rigidity equation, equation (4), defines the model.
Finally, the third equation implements the behavior of real interest rates.
Real interest rates will be only partially exogenous. The reason is the ex-
istence of a Taylor rule. If r were independent of the movement of i, there
would be no Taylor rule. The reason is simple and the mathematics, straight-
forward: imagine an unexpected rise in pi; accordingly, the central bank raises
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i; according to the Fisher equation, pi goes up again so the central bank keep
raising i endlessly. All solution paths are explosive. If there is a possibility of
a Taylor rule, and practice and estimations (Taylor (1993), Clarida, Gal´ı and
Gertler (1998)) say there is, the central bank cannot alter i without affecting
r. In fact, the central bank’s action has to affect r more than i for it to have
the inverse effect on pi. The central bank, if it has that effect on inflation,
must also affect real rates of interest. As such, the institution is not neutral.3
So the final equation has an exogenous part and a monetary policy part.
The monetary policy part acts as an error correction term between inflation
and its target,
rt = r
e
t + φ
(
Et
[
S∑
s=1
pit+s
]
− pi∗t
)
, (5)
where φ is positive and the length, S, represents, together with the ω’s from
before, the tightness of monetary policy. The shock term, re, represents
equilibrium real interest rates in the absence of monetary policy intervention.
In other words, it represents the real economy.
When part of a more complete model, the exogenous part, re, would in-
stead come from the model itself. This would involve a central bank inserting
itself in the equilibrium by buying or selling bonds. But, as stated earlier,
such an approach lays well beyond the scope of this paper.
Some restrictions on the model will be needed to make it useful, the next
section proposes some and presents results.
3 Implications
This section builds on the model by making assumptions on parameters and
postulating stochastic processes for real interest rates. Precisely, a linear form
is imposed on ω, an exponential form is imposed on the equation for x and re
is expressed as the sum of two exogenous shocks. Parameters are calibrated
for illustration purposes to yield reasonable results. These assumptions make
3Expressed in deviation from the steady state, the Taylor rule is ıˆt = αppˆit+αy yˆt where yˆ
is the output gap. Inserted into Fisher’s equation, it yields pˆit+1+rˆt+1 = αppˆit+αy yˆt which
is explosive if both r and y are exogenous since αp > 1. If instead we write the Taylor rule
as ıˆt = αppˆit+1+αy yˆt, insertion in the Fisher equation will yield (αp−1)pˆit+1 = rˆt+1−αy yˆt
which is not explosive, but in which reactions of inflation to both real interest rates and
the output gap are counterintuitive.
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it possible to derive impulse response functions and conduct simulations.4
The next two subsections present the results.
For illustration purposes, ret of equation (5) takes the form of two exoge-
nous shocks,
ret = r¯ + r
a
t−4 + r
s
t , (6)
where ra is an anticipated shock (four periods in advance) and rs is a surprise
shock. They are both defined as autoregressive process of order 1.
Furthermore, the rigidity equation, equation (4), has to be character-
ized. Because an exponential function would be intractable, we pose a linear
function for ωs with a length of n, or,
ωs =
{
n−s
n
for 0 ≤ s ≤ n
0 otherwise
.
A linear function has the advantage of ending at some point. This is
important because a Bellman equation would need an exponential function.
The linear function yields a tractable version of equation (4), which becomes
it =
n∑
s=1
n!
ns(n− s)!
(
s
n
Et−s+1
[
pi∗t+1 + rt+1
]
+
n− s
n
xt−s+1
)
. (7)
Variable x is simplified by posing two time invariant parameters γ and θ,
such that θγs = βsλt,t+s(1− ηt,t+s/2) for all t. So xt becomes
xt =
∞∑
s=0
θγs (Et [rt+1+s]− Et−1 [rt+1+s]) . (8)
These equations form the basis of the simulations that follow. Both im-
pulse response functions and simulations were done with the model using
parameters chosen for illustration purposes. Monetary policy is such that
the inflation target, pi∗, is at 0.5 percent per quarter and the horizon, S, is
calibrated at 4 for a forward horizon of one year. One year corresponds to
the usual time frame used by central banks and 2 percent per year is a com-
mon inflation target. Furthermore, the parameter φ is used to show what
happens when the central bank reacts (φ = 1.5) or not (φ = 0) to shocks.
For impulse response functions, the persistence parameters for the shocks are
set to ρ = 0.75 for temporary shocks and ρ = 0.999999 for permanent shocks
(not exactly 1 to secure a numerical solution). Other parameters are such
that γ = 0.99 and θ = 0.0025. Table 1 lists the parameter values.
4Impulse response functions, simulations and figures were obtained with Dynare on
Matlab. The default seed was used so not to influence results.
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Table 1: Parameter values
symbol value
Monetary policy horizon S 4
Inflation target pi∗ 0.005
Monetary policy tightness φ 1.5
Effective discount factor γ 0.99
Impact parameter θ 0.0025
Length of linear function n 16
3.1 Impulse response functions
This subsection shows what the model implies in terms of impact analysis.
Results from impulse response functions include: (1) a constant inflation
target lowers real interest rate volatility compared to no monetary policy
intervention, (2) a moving inflation target raises volatility even more, (3)
persistent shocks have more impact on nominal interest rates while transitory
shocks have more impact on inflation and (4) future real interest rate shocks
lead to immediate response thereby simulating what has been called the
price puzzle. Furthermore, the results reinforce the intuition behind nominal
interest rate rigidities as central banks need to move interest rates in the
opposite direction of where it wants to move inflation and credit conditions
causes inflation to be procyclical.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show three possible outcome for both temporary
and permanent positive one percent shocks. The shaded area represents
inflation implied by the difference between nominal and real interest rates.
These shocks are expressed in deviations from control levels. In both figures
shown, we set φ = 1.5, since both φ = 1.5 and φ = 0 yield similar looking
responses but with different size of deviations. This is the first result, it
basically means that a monetary policy of inflation targeting lowers variations
in real interest rates. It also means that real interest rates would increase
in volatility if a central bank was to adopt an inflation target that varied
through time. The monetary policy influence on real interest rates volatility
will be investigated in next subsection.
The figures indicate two additional results. First, a permanent shock has
a larger influence on nominal interest rates. More persistent shocks have more
effect on nominal interest rates, while temporary shocks affect inflation more.
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Figure 1: Temporary one percent shock responses
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Second, anticipated shocks simulate what has been called a price puzzle.5 As
we can see in Figure 2, rises in the nominal interest rate and the inflation
rate appear simultaneously some time before deflation sets in.
Those results reinforce the intuition behind nominal interest rate rigidi-
ties. First, it shows that, in the presence of rate rigidities, the Fisher effect is
inverted in the short term, so central banks can use interest to generate infla-
tion. The argument is a simple application of Fisher’s equation (i ' r + pi).
A rise in real interest rates can either be performed through a one to one rise
in nominal interest rates, an inverse one to one drop in inflation or a mix
of the two. In the presence of rigidities, a rise in real interest rates could
5The price puzzle was noticed by Sims (1992) who described it as an empirical anomaly.
It states that an increase (decrease) in interest rates will increase (decrease) inflation in
the short term before having the expected effect some quarters later. The name, price
puzzle, was quoted by Eichenbaum (1992).
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Figure 2: Permanent one percent shock responses
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Note: in percent deviation from control state.
not be followed by a proportional movement from nominal interest rates and
therefore would lead to disinflation. Therefore, the central bank’s operations
does not directly lower nominal interest rates, but, in reality, yanks down
the real ones. In doing so, it creates inflation.
Second, the results imply that the relationship between economic fluctu-
ations and inflation needs to be supported by a relationship between credit
conditions and fluctuations. The relationship between economic fluctuations
and prices, between inflation and the output gap or the presence of deflation-
ary pressures in (lets call them) ordinary recessions needs to come from an
inverse relation between real interest rates and production within the cyclical
time frame.
The existence of a link between credit conditions, as a fuller charac-
terization of recessions, and the 2008 recession as been widely discussed.
Such is the case in other periods as shown, for example, by Ng and Wright
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(2013), and Eckstein and Sinai (1986). To quote Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999, p. 1343): “First, it appears that introducing credit-market
frictions into the standard models can help improve their ability to explain
even ‘garden-variety’ cyclical fluctuations.” The predicting power of an in-
version of the yield curve on recessions (Stock and Watson (1989), Adrian,
Estrella and Hyun (2010) and Rudebusch and Williams (2009)) also suggest
that a credit crunch is an important part of the business cycle. The yield
curve inverts when credit is expected to be temporarily tight in the very near
future.
Of course, such a link does not predict the causal relationship, whether
from production to credit conditions in a financial accelerator type of argu-
ment, as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996, 1999) or Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), or from credit conditions to production in a credit cycle type
of argument. Without clarifying the issue, this paper makes a strong case for
future research into the relationship between fluctuations and credit condi-
tions. In fact, literature pertaining to credit conditions, whether of financial
accelerator or credit cycles flavors, is developing at a healthy pace.
3.2 Monetary regime simulations
Four different monetary regimes approximate interest rates data: a gold
standard, a liquidity trap, a non-target fiat and an inflation target regime.
A moving inflation target simulates the gold standard and replicates its high
volatility in ex post real interest rates. I skipped the liquidity trap. A
very persistent inflation target process simulates the non-target fiat regime,
replicating the non stationarity seen in nominal interest rates and the more
persistent ex post real rates. For the inflation target regime, the target
obviously does not move. All in all, simulations show there exists inflation
target schemes that can simulate how most real and nominal interest rates
behavior has looked.
The first part of Figure 3 shows data from Shiller (1989, Chapter 26) for
one year nominal and ex post real interest rates. The other parts of Figure
3 show simulations of the different monetary regimes. In order to simulate
the averaging effect that yearly data produces, the simulation output, pro-
grammed as quarterly, is annualized. Figure 4 shows the original quarterly
results. For all simulations, real interest rate processes have persistences of
0.9 and standard deviations of 0.0015 and 0.003 for surprise and anticipated
shocks respectively. Table 2 lists the shock parameter values applied to the
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Figure 3: Observed and simulated annualized real and nominal interest rates
for different monetary regimes
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regimes.
The interest rates data are divided into four different monetary regimes.
Table 3 compares the standard errors and correlation of nominal and real
interest rates for the data and the three regimes simulated. Is is the re-
strictions imposed on the model that explain the differences between data
and simulations. Consequently, the characterization of the rigidity equation
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Figure 4: Simulated quarterly real and nominal interest rates for different
monetary regimes
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needs more work. This is left for future research.
The first regime, before the Great Depression, corresponds to gold stan-
dard periods. It is one regime, though the gold standard was implemented in
different ways in practice, since different implementations are not apparent
in rates data. That regime is characterized by a high volatility in ex post real
interest rates and lower volatility in nominal interest rates; inflation volatility
is also large. The focus of the central bank on inflation, that started much
later, may explain that recent inflation persistence is visibly absent in this
period, although it is a stylized fact of the post-war economy. A moving
inflation target simulates the regime. This inflation target process is autore-
gressive of order 1. It had to have a large variance to make the graphs look
right. Consequently, the process has a standard deviation of 0.015 and a
persistence of 0.5. This supposes a large variance in gold prices, coherent
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Table 2: Shock parameter values
standard deviation persistence
Surprise real interest rate shock 0.0015 0.9
Anticipated real interest rate shock 0.003 0.9
Inflation target shocks
... under gold standard regime 0.015 0.5
... under non-target fiat regime 0.002 0.99
... under inflation target regime 0 —
Table 3: Standard errors and correlation
Data gold standard non-target fiat inflation target
std(r) 8.33 5.23 2.18
std(i) 1.27 3.60 2.12
corr(r,i) 0.54 0.40 0.89
Simulations gold standard non-target fiat inflation target
std(r) 5.99 2.70 2.21
std(i) 2.48 6.03 2.00
corr(r,i) 0.49 0.30 0.97
with gold prices still seen today.
Inflation target volatility has an interesting effect. This volatility greatly
increases real interest rate volatility and puts the Great Moderation in per-
spective.6 The standard deviation of real interest rates under the gold stan-
dards is predicted by this model to be nearly four times that of real interest
rates under the inflation target regime.
The second regime, from the Great Depression to before the Bretton
Woods system, has seen the economy going in and out of either a liquidity
trap or severe financial repression. That regime is characterized by often
negative ex post real interest rates and nominal interest rates near the zero
bound. The regime was not simulated. The model is not equipped to deal
with asymmetries caused by the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates.
6The Great Moderation was uncovered by Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000) and quoted by Stock and Watson (2003) to describe how, since the
mid-eighties, the volatility of many macroeconomic variables had diminished.
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With bonds having the same yield as money, there may also be a few addi-
tional issues relating to the buying and selling of bonds by the government
that are posited in the model. Consequently, the issues surrounding zero
interest rates will not be addressed in this paper.
The third regime, the non-target fiat, starts with the Bretton Woods
Agreement and ends sometimes in the late eighties or early nineties. Though
Bretton Woods is officially a gold standard regime, it acts more like a fiat
regime; fixed exchange rates meant that the inflation target may have sim-
ply been managed globally. This regime seems plagued by non-stationarity.
Unlike under the other regimes, sometimes real and nominal interest rates
move in visibly opposite directions. From the model’s perspective, these op-
posite moves signal when changes in real rates are prompted by changes in
the inflation target. For the postwar period until around the eighties, I de-
termined that a very persistent inflation target process, almost a unit root,
would best describe what was happening as inflation went gradually higher
until Volker, then went gradually down until the early nineties. The apparent
non-stationarity in the data pleads for the use of highly persistent shocks.
Thus, the inflation target process is autoregressive of order 1 with a standard
deviation of 0.002 and a persistence of 0.99.
The results from simulation of this regime show how almost-non-stationa-
rity in inflation leads to almost-non-stationarity in nominal rates. Real rate
are still stationary, but with more persistence than in other regimes. Further-
more, we have real and nominal interest rates moving sometimes in opposite
directions as found in the data.
The last regime saw some form of inflation targeting scheme. Consis-
tent with a highly persistent inflation rate, both real and nominal interest
rates seem to want to move in tandem. In this regime, the inflation target
does not change. The inflation target process could have included a small
non-persistent error term to account for errors in predictions made by the
central bank; this would be useful in a projection model where curve fitting
is necessary, not here. The results are as expected as the annualized nominal
and real rates tend to move in tandem except for when the real rate moves
in a spike. In such a spike move, the nominal rate will not completely follow.
To summarize, all three regimes can be described by different inflation
targets: the gold standards by a volatile inflation target, the non-target fiat
regime by a variable but persistent target and the more recent regime by a
fixed target. In terms of results, the variable inflation targets increase real
interest rate volatility, non-stationary inflation targets lead to non-stationary
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nominal interest rates and more persistence of real interest rates, while con-
stant targets lead to more stable real interest rates.
We can conclude that there exists an inflation target schemes that can
simulate how real and nominal interest rates behavior looks. For lack of a
thorough empirical investigation, we can say, at the very least, the model
looks promising: the interest rate processes that emerges from simulation
are realistic.
3.3 Digression on estimation
Estimation of the Fisher equation dates from Fisher himself. Of course,
it is always a restriction on the equation that is being estimated since the
equation itself is more or less a definition. Most involve real interest rate
persistence, an extensive recent review of which is provided by Neely and
Rapach (2008). In developing an estimation strategy, we are faced with the
problem of determining the restrictions on the economy that we want to test.
Use of data is also problematic since the representative agent’s interest
rate may be difficult to find or even to define. The concept of a representative
agent’s interest rate will complicate empirical validation, but this concept will
also legitimize the point made about tight credit in recessions as spreads are
procyclical and may not entirely reflect the movement of the probabilities of
default, but other aspects as well, among them liquidity preferences. The
ideal may be an interest rate of lower investment grade, say BBB, without
the risk premium.
Furthermore, precedent studies are difficult to apply here for two reasons.
First, as stated earlier, studies of interest rates have often taken nominal
interest rates to be exogenous, as they are believed to be directly controlled
by monetary authorities. The present framework does allow complete control
of nominal interest rates by said authorities, but only indirectly. Second,
calculations of ex ante real interest rates are done using inflation expectations
which, even when relying on polls, come from smoothed forms of realized
inflation. As such, if nominal interest rates are believed to be rigid, so will the
resultant real interest rates. From this model’s perspective, oversmoothing
of real interest rates will create a bias.
One option would be to develop a complete structural model that would
generate a credible link between real interest rates and production. Since
standard RBC’s or even DSGE’s do not always have pro-cyclical interest
rates, this model would have to have a credit channel a` la Bernanke, Gertler
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and Gilchrist (1996, 1999), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or more recent vari-
ants. The choices involved would greatly expand the scope of this paper
without making it more relevant. The work of evaluating this theory of in-
flation within complete models is thus left to future research as it deserves
its own paper or papers.
Another option involves testing the persistence of nominal interest rate
with restrictions imposed by inflation data and the present theoretical frame-
work as to how the rigidities take shape. Unfortunately, preliminary investi-
gations have shown that complex questions arise from the form of the equa-
tions to estimate especially in terms of identification. It is, for example,
possible to characterize nominal interest rates and inflation with the sole use
of of a variable inflation target while leaving the equilibrium real interest
almost unchanged over the whole sample. These questions need specific an-
swers. Again, the sheer size of this article would grow uncomfortably bigger.
Therefore, it has been decided to keep the estimation for later research.
4 Conclusion
A vast literature supports the central postulate that interest rate are rigid, as
well as the procyclicality of inflation and how we believe monetary authorities
use interest rates to manipulate inflation. This paper looked at the impact
of rigidities in nominal interest rates. It offers a model to explain rigidities
in nominal interest rates based on rational decisions in perfect competition
without relying on commitments as commitments are unrealistic when faced
with real interest rates and inflation.
In terms of results, the paper shows that an interest rate model of infla-
tion could be a satisfactory implementation of price evolution inside a larger
macroeconomic model. It explains the two major stylized facts about infla-
tion: how central banks move nominal interest rates in opposite direction to
control inflation and why credit conditions around recessions lead to defla-
tionary pressures. Side contributions include a possible explanation of the
price puzzle, from the preemptive aspect of nominal interest rate setting, and
of the Great Moderation, from the destabilizing effect of variable inflation
target policies prior to the mid-eighties.
One improvement would benefit the model: improving the rigidity equa-
tion. As we have seen, the parametrization of the rigidity equation was
constructed for exposition purposes and might not do in a workhorse model.
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Furthermore, although simulation results are realistic, no estimation of the
model’s parameters or test of the theory has been offered. They are left for
future research.
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